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Abstract: This paper offers a synoptic account of the state of the debate within Marxist scholars 
regarding the current structural crisis of capitalism, identifies two broad streams within the 
literature dealing, in turn, with aggregate demand and profitability problems, and proceeds to 
concentrate on an analysis of issues surrounding the profitability problem in two steps. First, 
evidence on profitability trends for the Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business, the 
Nonfinancial Corporate Business and the Corporate Business sectors in post-War U.S. are 
summarized. A broad range of profit rate measures are covered and data from both the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (NIPA and Fixed Asset Tables) and the Federal Reserve (Flow of 
Funds Account) are used. Second, the underlying drivers of profitability, in terms of technology 
and distribution, are investigated. The profitability analysis is used to offer some hypotheses 
about the current structural crisis. 
JEL Codes: B51, E11. 
Keywords: profitability, technological change, income distribution, structural crisis.   
 
 
1. Introduction 
The US and the global economy are in the grip of the most profound crisis since the Great 
Depression. The course of capitalist development has been punctuated by such deep structural crisis – 
the Long Depression in the 1880‟s, the Great Depression in the 1930‟s, the Stagflation of the seventies 
and the current crisis. Marxist analysis sees these recurrent crises as reflections of the inherently 
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contradictory and turbulent nature of capitalist accumulation.
1
 The precise causal mechanisms 
underlying the present crisis remain subject to intense debate among Marxist scholars. This is not 
surprising. Despite a long engagement with the theory of crisis, Marxist scholarship has not developed 
a single, overarching “general theory” of capitalist crisis.  
The structural crisis of the seventies had also engendered a rich debate on the root cause of the 
crisis. The “Monthly Review School” saw the crisis as a reflection of the tendency towards stagnation 
fostered by the dominance of monopoly. In the absence of external factors, the development of 
productive capacity outpaced internally generated demand (Baran and Sweezy 1966, Sweezy and 
Magdoff 1981). The “Profit Squeeze” explanation ascribed the eruption of crisis to the impact of rising 
wages in eroding profitability (Glyn and Sutcliffe 1972; Body and Crotty 1975). Within the Social 
Structures of Accumulation Theory, the crisis was seen as an outcome of declining labor productivity 
with a fall in the intensity of work (Bowles, Gordon and Weisskopf, 1987).  In Brenner‟s account, the 
crisis was precipitated by intensification of competition, which squeezed profit margins and led to 
persistent overcapacity in manufacturing (Brenner, 2006). In contrast, while Shaikh (1987) explains the 
crisis of the seventies as stemming from a falling rate of profit due to a process of increasing capital 
intensity and labor saving technical change that is reflected in a rising “materialized composition of 
capital”. Moseley (1992, 2000) highlights the growth of the ratio of unproductive to productive labor as 
the main reason for declining profitability and stagnation.  
While the explanations varied, these rival theories at least agreed on the nature of the empirical 
trend of falling profitability that marked the crisis of the seventies. A peculiar feature of the current 
debate is the absence of agreement on the basic question of the predominant trend in profitability 
leading up to the crisis. Given the centrality of the question of profitability to Marx‟s analysis of 
capitalist dynamics, a constructive evolution of the theoretical debate around the causal mechanisms 
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engendering the current crisis would require some resolution of the empirical trends. This paper does 
not attempt to resolve the larger theoretical debates in the theory of crises; instead it seeks to clarify 
some of the empirical issues in the debate on the origins of the current crisis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief overview of the main 
competing accounts of the current crisis. Section 3 investigates and summarizes profitability trends; 
Section 4 presents results on profit rate decomposition in order to investigate the roles of technology 
and distribution as drivers of profitability
2
. This investigation offers some interesting insights into the 
different regimes of technological change in Postwar United States.  Specifically it points to the 
significance of the sharp fall in capital productivity in the period preceding the crisis. Declining capital 
productivity is an important driver of declining profitability in Marx‟s analysis. This bias in the pattern 
of technical change has been explained as a response to the pressure of rising wages. The recent sharp 
decline in capital productivity is remarkable in that it occurs in the context of stagnant wages. The final 
section of the paper offers an account of this development in the context of the crisis. 
2. Explaining the Current Crisis 
 The dominance of finance and the phenomena of financialization is no doubt an important 
aspect of any account of the current crisis
3
. What distinguishes Marxist explanations is that while they 
recognize the importance of financialization and the role of financial speculation in triggering the 
crisis, they seek structural explanations for the rise to dominance of finance and for the real component 
of the current crisis.  
Marxist accounts of the causal mechanisms of crisis fall very broadly into those focusing on 
aggregate demand and those focusing on profitability.  The former focuses on the growing gap between 
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 For accounts of the role of finance in the unfolding of the crisis see Gowan (2009), Blackburn (2009), Lapavitsas (2010), 
Crotty and Epstein (2009) 
productivity of workers and their earnings. Growing inequality exacerbates the problem of effective 
demand, with investment failing to fill the gap. The latter trend, i.e., the one focusing on profitability, 
focuses on the specific pattern of technical change induced by capitalist competition. Labor 
productivity is increased by increasing mechanization and capital intensity of the production process, 
with a consequent tendency, with stable profit shares, for a fall in the profit rate.  There is of course a 
link between problems of demand and problems of profitability. Stagnation of demand could erode 
profitability and rates of return on capital investment, and declining profitability itself could lead to a 
fall in investment demand. 
In the competing explanations of the current crisis too we find this dual focus on stagnation of 
demand and the declining rate of profit.  
 
2.1. The Alternative Explanations 
2.1.1. Stagnation under Monopoly-Finance Capital  
Bellamy Foster and Magdoff (2009) base their argument on the characterization of 
contemporary capitalism as the phase of monopoly-finance capitalism. This argument draws on the 
analytical tradition of Kalecki, Steindl, Baran and Sweezy. Monopolization erodes price competition 
and dampens the dynamic impetus to new innovations. At the same time growing income and wealth 
inequality acts as a limit to consumption demand. The investment-seeking surplus generated by the 
enormous and growing productivity of the system is increasingly unable to find sufficient new 
profitable investment outlets. Monopoly capitalism faces a tendency toward stagnation as a 
consequence of the gap between the growing economic surplus and existing outlets for profitable 
investment. There is a continual need to find new ways to profitably invest its surplus and new sources 
of demand. But rather than invest in socially useful projects that would benefit the vast majority, capital 
has constructed a financialized "casino". Capitalism in its monopoly-finance capital phase becomes 
increasingly reliant on the ballooning of the credit-debt system in order to escape the worst aspects of 
stagnation. Thus it is this tendency to stagnation that engenders financialization.  Finance has served as 
a lucrative outlet for economic surplus while also indirectly stimulating demand through asset price 
appreciations and bubbles. The housing bubble is then seen as an attempt to counteract this inherent 
tendency towards stagnation. With the bursting of the bubble, demand collapsed, leading to a deep 
crisis. 
 
2.1.2. Over-competition and Over-accumulation 
In contrast to the monopoly-finance phase argument, Brenner‟s (2010) argument stresses 
globalization and the intensification of competition since the seventies as new manufacturing powers 
entered the world market – Germany and Japan, the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs), the South 
East Asian ``Tigers'' and, most recently China. This has led to a persistent tendency to overcapacity in 
global manufacturing and a consequent decline of the rate of return on capital investment since the 
seventies. The stagnation of real wages in this period is insufficient to counteract the dampening impact 
of chronic overcapacity on profitability. In response capital has been cutting back on the growth of 
plant and equipment and retrenching and rationalizing the workforce and has also successfully pushed 
the agenda for slashing social expenditures. All of which has contributed to a persistent weakness of 
aggregate demand. This is the source of vulnerability of the economy.  
The vulnerability is manifested in over-investment, declining capacity utilization, a squeeze of 
manufacturing prices and declining profitability. The growth of finance temporary alleviated some of 
the shortfall of demand – through a form of asset Keynesianism. However this underlying structural 
weakness continued to plague the economy, fostering an increasing dependence on finance. 
 
 2.1.3. Over-Investment 
An alternative thesis posited by Kotz (2009, 2011) also ascribes a central causal role to 
developing overcapacity. However, it is not excessive competition but asset price bubbles that fosters 
over-capacity. Such bubbles temporarily push demand above its normal level, spurring creation of 
growing productive capacity – over investment. With debt deflation, demand returns to its normal 
level, precipitating excess productive capacity. Over-investment results in too much fixed capital being 
produced relative to demand in the economy as a whole. The housing bubble encouraged debt financed 
consumer spending stimulating excessive investment in relation to normal level demands. The growing 
gap between wages and profits, between increase in labor productivity and wage earnings of production 
workers implies a more limited normal level of consumer demand. Stoked by the asset bubble and 
rising indebtedness, household consumer demand rises above its normal relation to household income 
and firms step up investment. Unsustainable expectations about future profit and demand led to 
overinvestment. As the expectations fail to materialize with the collapse of the bubble, capacity 
utilization rates fell, driving down the profit rate and finally the rate of investment was sharply cut 
back. The crisis manifests itself in declining capacity utilization that exerts a downward pressure on the 
rate of profit.  
 
2.1.4. Profitability and Debt 
Shaikh (2010) focuses on the underlying trends in profitability as the principal driver of 
accumulation. In particular he focuses on the “rate of profit of enterprise”, the difference between the 
general rate of profit (where profits are measured gross of interest payments) and the rate of interest as 
the crucial variable that governs investment. The competitive impetus towards increasing 
mechanization and labour substituting technical change engenders the underlying long term tendency 
towards a fall in the profit rate. However, the concerted attack on labour launched in the eighties, 
stemmed the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, as real wages stagnated through this period. Along 
with the suppression of the growth of real wages there was a sharp fall in the interest rate. Together 
these two trends acted to raise the rate of profit of enterprise and fuelled the neoliberal boom. This 
boom, and the regime of low interest rates had the contradictory effect of stoking a surge of debt and 
borrowing. The boom was halted when the fall in interest rates and the rise in degree of indebtedness 
reached their limits. The favourable upward trend in the rate of profit of enterprise came to an end, 
precipitating the crisis.  
Moseley (2010) offers a similar explanation, according primacy of place to both profitability 
and debt. Declining profitability, driven primarily by the rising cost of unproductive labour, in the 
1960s pushed to economy towards a phase of prolonged stagnation. Two sets of factors were adopted 
to counter declining profitability. First, wage suppression in the U.S., increasing exploitation of labour 
in the form of “speed-up”, widespread bankruptcies and globalization as the worldwide search for 
lower wages; and second, unprecedented levels of credit flows to both capitalist firms and working-
class households. Over time, this led to a historically high level of debt, a significant portion of which 
is external debt, build-up relative to aggregate income flows. This debt overhang is a source of 
continued fragility and stagnation for the U.S. economy. 
 
2.1.5. Liquidity trap and Disproportionality 
Michl (2010) also focuses on the role of profitability in driving investment. The puzzle of 
sluggish growth of non-residential investment despite a favourable trend in profitability is explained by 
greater uncertainty about prospective yields and weaker expectations about the future in the face of 
rising external imbalances and import penetration of the US market by Chinese manufactures. The 
erosion of investor confidence due to the relocation of global manufacturing and the rise of competing 
centers of production around China propelled the descent into a liquidity trap. The recovery after the 
2001 recession was largely concentrated on residential investment so that the current crisis, in this 
account, appears to be a crisis of disproportionality rather than that of “over-investment”.  
 
2.1.6. Crisis of financial hegemony 
Dumenil and Levy (2010), and Mohun (2010) do not see the current crisis as the outcome of 
falling profitability.  Both focus on the growing disparity in the incomes of the managerial and 
supervisory class in relation to the production worker and the popular classes (including commercial 
and clerical employees) and increasing economic power of the former class. This class configuration 
underlies what Dumenil and Levy characterize as the hegemony of finance (2004, 2010)
4
. The 
unbridled quest for enrichment by the ruling classing coalition spurred the process of financialization 
and globalization. In the process persistent macro-disequilibria were generated in the form of rising 
indebtedness, growing global imbalances (boosted by a rising share of consumption in the US) and the 
slowdown of accumulation. The growth of finance and speculation is explained not through the 
exhaustion of investment opportunities and falling profitability but rather the changing class 
configuration that favours short-term risk taking. The slowdown in investment is also the outcome of 
the success of this ruling elite to capture a growing share of surplus.  
 
2.2. State of the Debate 
 Thus the crisis has been characterized at one end as that of a structural inadequacy of aggregate 
demand that might only be temporarily alleviated by asset price bubbles or stock market Keynesianism 
(Bellamy Foster 2009; Brenner 2010; Kotz 2011). The inadequacy of demand is seen alternatively as a 
reflection of growing monopoly (Bellamy Foster 2009), and of intensification of competition (Brenner 
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 Paitaridis and Tsoulifidis (2011) use the categories of unproductive and productive labor and show that even though the 
general rate of profit was rising, the rate of profit when profits were calculated net  of deductions for outlays on 
unproductive sectors declined, gradually  choking off  accumulation 
2010). At the other end, Dumenil and Levy (2010) point to the declining personal savings rate and 
growing external deficits of the US to suggest that the current conjuncture is marked by over-
consumption.  Again there is the argument that the crisis was preceded by an investment boom because 
of a temporary boost to demand (Kotz 2011) on the one hand, and a temporary alleviation of the trend 
of falling profitability (Shaikh 2010) on the other. In stark contrast to this is the argument of persistent 
slowdown in investment (Dumenil and Levy 2010).  Again, the crisis is seen as being characterized by 
declining profitability (Brenner 2010, Kliman 2010) in some explanations and rising profitability 
(Dumenil and Levy 2010, Mohun 2010) in other explanations. Even within the explanations based on 
rising profitability, Mohun (2010), on the one hand, sees the crisis coming from the upswing in 
profitability and speculative excess culminating in a financial crisis that makes its impact on the real 
sector felt through the consequent evaporation of demand, while Dumenil and Levy (2010), on the 
other, argue that the current crisis cannot be categorized either as demand  or profitability crisis – hence 
the alternative typology of a “crisis of financial hegemony”. Finally the rise of finance itself is 
explained in some approaches as the outcome of the stagnation of the real economy (Bellamy- Foster 
2009) and in others as a manifestation of increasing profitability, euphoric speculative excess, and the 
rules of the neoliberal order that draws surplus from investment, towards distribution in the form of 
capital incomes - interest and dividends (Dumenil and Levy 2010; Mohun 2010). 
Not only is there intense debate on the structural causes of the crisis, there seems to be no 
agreement even on the more easily resolvable issues of the underlying empirical trends. A survey of 
literature is confronted by a daunting excess of conflicting characterizations
5
. As a first step towards 
resolving the debate, it is necessary to clarify these underlying empirical trends.  We might not come 
closer to a consensus on explaining the crisis, but for constructive debate there has to be some 
coherence to the account of the empirical contours of the crisis.  
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 See Dumenil and Levy (2011) for a critical, empirically grounded review of some of these alternative interpretations.  
The first question concerns the underlying trend of profitability. Was the rate of profit rising or 
falling in the prelude to the crisis? There is broad agreement that profitability is central to capitalist 
reproduction. However, even though there is broad agreement about the importance of profitability, the 
precise measure of the rate of profit remains a contentious issue.  
Estimates of the profit rate differ, for instance, on the treatment of direct profit taxes, i.e. taxes 
on corporate income. Dumenil and Levy (2011) argue that profit taxes would also need to be deducted 
for a more realistic yardstick of profit flows. The measure of “capital stock” could be valued at 
historical values or replacement values. Replacement cost measures are favored as being more 
reflective both of business practice (Shaikh 1999, Dumenil and Levy 2011) and Marx's own writings.
6
 
The stock could be measured net or gross of the depreciation allowance. Net stock measures impart an 
upward bias to profit rates since net stocks decline with the age of the machine (Shaikh 1999). Again, 
demand factors which impart short run fluctuations to the profit rate could be removed from the 
picture, by deflating the observed rate of profit with capacity utilization rate, to arrive at longer-term 
trends of profitability (Shaikh 1999). The measure of choice could then drive the empirical outcome. 
It is equally important to untangle the drivers of profitability, to decompose the rate of profit 
into its underlying determinants. The trends in labor productivity, capital productivity, and profit share 
are important in unraveling the role of technology and distribution in determining the trajectory of the 
profit rate. Were shifts in income distribution important, or were technological factors salient, or were 
demand factors more important? Even here, as we discuss in detail later, there are differences in how 
the decomposition is implemented. 
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 We believe Marx was quite unambiguously in favor of using replacement cost valuation of the capital stock. Discussing 
the scenario where a new and less costly (in terms of labor hours required for its production) machinery has been inducted 
into the production process, he notes: “As the value of the raw material may change, so too may that of the instruments of 
labor, the machinery, etc. employed in the [production] process; and consequently that portion of the value of the product 
transferred to it from them may also change. If, as a result of a new invention, machinery of a particular kind can be 
produced with a lessened expenditure of labor, the old machinery undergoes a certain amount of depreciation, and therefore 
transfers proportionately less value to the product.” (Marx, 1990, p. 318). 
 The second empirical question relates to demand.  To what extent has consumption demand 
been a constraint on investment? Can we empirically assess the prevalence of overinvestment in 
relation to either demand or profitability? In the context of globalization the question becomes more 
vexed as consumption could be growing buoyantly without a commensurate impact on domestic 
investment, as a larger share of consumption demand is fulfilled by imports. Domestic investment 
could stagnate even as domestic capital steps up foreign direct investment and off-shores production in 
the search for lower wage locations in the periphery. 
Clarity on these two major issues, the question of profitability and the question of aggregate 
demand, would help answer the question of whether the rise of finance, one of the key characteristic 
features of contemporary capitalism, reflects the stagnation of the real economy – either in the form of 
low profitability or low demand – or a reconfiguration of class relations of advanced capitalism.  While 
issues surrounding the question of aggregate demand are important and deserve serious analyses, this 
paper will attempt to address the first question. It will primarily focus on disentangling the profitability 
issue in two steps. First, it will present profitability trends for the post-War U.S. economy for a wide 
range of definitions. Second, it will try to analyze the trends in technology and distribution to throw 
light on the drivers of profitability. 
 
3. Profitability Trends 
There is a broad consensus within the Marxist tradition, as we have already indicated, to see the 
rate of profit as one of the crucial variables determining the decidedly turbulent dynamics of any 
capitalist economy and crucially affecting its reproduction through time. As indicated by Marx in 
Volume II of Capital and demonstrated rigorously within a formal mathematical model by Foley 
(1982), the rate of expansion of a capitalist economy is limited by the general rate of profit that it can 
generate. The intuition is straightforward. Expansion of a capitalist economy is the accumulation of 
capital; accumulation, in its turn, rests on capitalizing surplus value, i.e., generating and realizing 
surplus value. Since profit is a form of expression of surplus value, it follows that the rate of profit 
governs the rate of expansion of the system. On the demand side it has an impact on the inducement to 
investment; on the supply side, it determines the financing of investment. There is also in addition a 
link between profitability and stability (Dumenil and Levy (1993)
7
. 
 The rate of profit is defined as the ratio of profit flows in a given time period to the capital 
value tied-up (stock of capital) in production and circulation that supported the generation and 
realization of the profit flow. Disagreement among Marxist political economists arises because there 
are different ways to measure both profit flows and the stock of capital. Profit flows could be defined, 
in the broadest sense, to include all income flows other than compensation of employees. Starting from 
the broad measure, we could gradually remove depreciation, indirect taxes on production and imports, 
direct taxes, interest payments, and dividend payments, to arrive at progressively narrower definitions 
of profit flows.  
The broadest measure of the “stock of capital” that underlies the profit flows should include 
productive capital (undepreciated fixed assets, raw materials and inventories of unfinished 
commodities), commodity capital (inventories of finished commodities awaiting sale) and financial 
capital (money, including depreciation funds, and financial assets). Since it is difficult to come across 
consistent time series data on all these forms in which stocks of value appear in a capitalist economy, 
most researchers narrow down the measure of capital to fixed assets.
8
 Even with this narrow definition, 
measures could vary across at least four dimensions. First, the stock of fixed assets could be measured 
net of depreciation to give the net stock of fixed assets or could include depreciation to give the gross 
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8 In the Appendix, we include the value of inventories of the nonfarm sector to estimate a broader measure of capital stock. 
The profitability trends and decomposition analysis do not change when this broader measure if used; for details, see the 
Appendix. 
stock of fixed assets. Second, the stock could be valued at historical costs (i.e., at prices paid when they 
were originally installed and inducted into the production and circulation process) or they could be 
valued at replacement cost (i.e., at the current market value that would be sufficient to replace the stock 
of fixed assets). Third, the stock of assets could be valued net of liabilities to give us the net worth. 
Fourth, since a given stock of capital can be utilized at or below capacity depending on conditions of 
demand, deflating by the capacity utilization rate could be used to arrive at the “normal capacity” 
measure of the capital stock.    
Instead of taking a stand right away on the “correct” measure of the rate of profit, this section 
summarizes trends in all the measures of the profit rate. This evidence regarding profitability trends in 
the post War U.S. Economy is meant to offer a chance to readers to see for themselves how the 
different measures evolve over time and, if possible, to push researchers to come to an agreement about 
a common measure to use. We use annual data, and in defining the (various measures of the) rate of 
profit terms we follow the following timing convention: the profit rate for a given year has been 
computed by dividing the profit income for a particular year by the estimate of the stock of fixed assets 
at the end of the previous year. This timing convention is meant to capture the idea that the stock of 
fixed assets at the beginning of a year (or end of the previous year) “earned” the profit income for that 
year.  
In this section, we present profitability trends for the U.S. economy using data from two 
different sources: (1) National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), and Fixed Asset data of the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and (2) Flow of Funds (FOF) data from the Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors. The NIPA data, in turn, is presented for two different large sectors of the U.S. 
Economy: (a) the Corporate Business (CB) sector, and (b) the Nonfinancial Corporate Business 
(NFCB) sector. The FOF data is presented for the Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business (NNFCB) 
sector.  
 FIGURE 1: Rate of Profit, U.S. Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital Stock: 
Replacement Cost Net Total Fixed Assets) 
 
FIGURE 2: Rate of Profit, U.S. Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital Stock: Historical 
Cost Net Total Fixed Assets) 
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 FIGURE 3: Rate of Profit, U.S. Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital Stock: 
Replacement Cost Gross Total Fixed Assets) 
 
FIGURE 4: Rate of Profit, U.S. Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital Stock: Historical 
Cost Gross Total Fixed Assets) 
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3.1. BEA Data: NIPA and Fixed Asset Tables  
3.1.1. Corporate Business (CB) Sector    
Figure 1 and 2 plot the annual rate of profit for the U.S. corporate business sector computed 
from NIPA data using replacement cost and historical cost values, respectively, for the net stock of total 
fixed asset. The data for various measures of the flow of profit come from NIPA Table 1.14 and run up 
to 2010, and the data for the stock of total fixed assets come from NIPA Table 6.1 through 6.4, with the 
latter giving year-end estimates of the stock. The profit rate for a given year, as already noted, has been 
computed by dividing the profit income for a particular year by the estimate of the stock of fixed assets 
at the end of the previous year.  
The broadest measure of profit flows, in Figures 1 and 2, is net value added less compensation 
of employees including inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments. Starting from this 
broad measure we arrive at narrower measures of profit flows by removing different categories of 
income flows. Our broad measure less production and import taxes gives net operating surplus. When 
we further remove net interest payments and net business transfer payments we get before-tax profits; 
when we remove taxes on corporate income from this, we arrive at after-tax profits
9
.  
Figure 3 and 4 summarize profitability trends that are similar to those summarized in Figures 1 
and 2. The only difference is that, in Figures 3 and 4, gross capital stock measures are used instead of 
net capital stock measures.
10
 The profit flow measures are exactly the same, with one addition, gross 
operating surplus, which is defined as the sum of net operating surplus and depreciation.   
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depreciation. With geometric depreciation, gross stocks cannot be computed accurately because some assets in each vintage 
of the stock have infinite service lives. Hence, our estimates of the gross capital stock used in this paper are only 
approximations. For more details see U.S. Department of Commerce (2003). We would like to thanks Thomas R Michl for 
pointing this out. 
3.1.2. Nonfinancial Corporate Business (NFCB) Sector 
Within a Marxian framework of analysis, financial sector incomes (and profits) are a transfer of 
surplus value generated in the non-financial sectors of the economy. Hence, we next look at 
profitability trends solely in the nonfinancial corporate business sector. 
Figure 5 is the analog of Figure 1. It plots the rate of profit for the NFCB sector using 
replacement cost valuation of the net total fixed asset (capital stock). Figure 6 corresponds to Figure 2; 
it plots the rate of profit for the NFCB sector using historical cost valuation of the capital stock. Figures 
7 and 8 are the analogs of Figures 3 and 4 in that they plot the various measures of the rate of for the 
NFCB sector using gross total fixed assets as the measure of capital stock.   
 
3.1.3. Summary of Profit Rate Trends: NIPA data  
When replacement cost valuation of the capital stock is used, evolution of the rate of profit in 
both the CB and NFCB sector (Figures 1, 3, 5 and 7) indicate two major periods; this periodization, 
moreover, is independent of the measure of profit that is used (before or after tax, with or without IVA 
& CCAdj, including or excluding interest payments). The first, running from the late 1940s to the early 
1980s, was a period of declining profitability (with fluctuations at business cycle frequencies imposed 
on top of this declining trend). This period ended in the early 1980s; the declining trend was reversed 
and we enter into the second period, which saw an upward trend in profitability (with large fluctuations 
coinciding with the downturns in the late 1990s and the Great Recession).  The current crisis was not 
preceded by a long period of declining profitability as was in evidence during the structural crisis of the 
late 1970s; the fall in the rate of profit during the current crisis coincides with a short run downward 
movement associated with fluctuations of the rate of profit at business cycle frequencies. 
 FIGURE 5: Rate of Profit, U.S. Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital 
Stock: Replacement Cost Net Total Fixed Assets) 
 
FIGURE 6: Rate of Profit, U.S. Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital 
Stock: Historical Cost Net Total Fixed Assets) 
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 FIGURE 7: Rate of Profit, U.S. Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital 
Stock: Replacement Cost Net Total Fixed Assets) 
 
FIGURE 8: Rate of Profit, U.S. Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital 
Stock: Replacement Cost Net Total Fixed Assets) 
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When historical cost valuation of the capital stock is used (Figures 2, 4, 6 and 8), we see two 
interesting patterns. First, broader measures of the rate of profit (using the net or gross operating 
surplus, for instance) display a trend of secular decline over the whole post War period for both the CB 
and the NFCB sectors. Second, narrower measures of the rate of profit (using after-tax, after-interest 
rate of profit, for instance) display a different pattern: a period of decline that runs up to the early 1980s 
is followed by a trend-less period after that.  
The conclusion from the analysis of NIPA data seems to be that there is a break in the declining 
trend of profitability in the early 1980s; this emerges for all measures of profit flows when replacement 
cost valuation is used for the capital stock, and it also emerges for narrower measures of profit flow 
when historical cost valuation is used. The only measures that fail to display this break in trend in the 
early 1980s, are those using historical cost valuation (of the stock of capital) and the broad measures of 
profit flows.
11
  
 
3.2. Flow of Funds 
Using data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve, we compute various 
measures of the rate of profit for the U.S. Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business (NNFCB) sector. 
The FOF data is useful for two reasons. First, it allows us to analyze trends in the NNFCB sector, 
which is not possible on the basis of NIPA data. Second, it allows us to use net worth as a measure of 
tied-up capital, which, again, is not possible with NIPA data.  We use two different measures of the 
tied-up capital: the total nonfinancial assets, and net worth. 
Figures 9 and 10 plot the rate of profit for the U.S. Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business 
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 Historical cost valuation basically “rotates” the profit rate time series by raising the early observations and lowering the 
later ones. This is because historical cost valuation of the capital stock amounts to ignoring inflation in the price of fixed 
assets. Since the rate of profit is the ratio of the profit flow and the stock of capital, ignoring the inflation in the price of the 
term appearing in the denominator “rotates” the whole series. We would like to thank Duncan Foley for this insight.  
 
(NNFCB) sector computed from flow of funds data from the Federal Reserve, the first using the stock 
of nonfinancial assets valued at replacement cost and the second the stock of nonfinancial assets 
valued at historical cost. The shaded region at the end indicates the Great Recession beginning in 2008. 
Figures 11 and 12 are the analogs of Figures 9 and 10. They plot the rate of profit for the U.S. 
Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business (NNFCB) sector computed from flow of funds data from 
the Federal Reserve suing the net worth valued at replacement cost and historical cost, respectively. 
 
3.2.1. Summary of Profit Rate Trends: Flow of Funds data  
Nonfinancial Assets: Figure 9 and 10, computed from Flow of Funds data and using the year-
end estimates of nonfinancial assets to measure capital stock arrive at pretty much the same trend as 
Figures 1, 3, 5 and 7.  
In terms of trend, both sets of plots highlight the two major periods referred to earlier, 
irrespective of what measure of profit income is used (before or after tax, with or without IVA & 
CCAdj, including or excluding interest payments) and how the capital stock is valued (replacement 
cost or historical cost, gross or net). The first period of declining profitability ends in the early 1980s, 
and is followed by (1) a period with rising trend (with large fluctuations coinciding with the downturns 
in the late 1990s and the Great Recession) if replacement costs valuation is used for the nonfinancial 
assets, and (2) a more or less trendless period if historical cost valuation is used.   
 In terms of levels, there is an interesting difference. With historical cost valuation of assets, the 
level of after-tax and after-interest rate of profit since the 1980s is generally lower than that observed in 
the 1950s; with replacement cost valuation, the levels are closer together. The before-tax before-interest 
rate of profit (including IVA and CCAdj) attains similar levels in both periods, irrespective of asset 
valuation method.  
Hence, from Figures 9 and 10, we can assert that the current crisis was not preceded by a long 
period of declining profitability as was in evidence during the structural crisis of the late 1970s. 
 
Net Worth: Figure 11 and 12 plot the rate of profit using the net worth instead of the stock of 
nonfinancial assets. With replacement cost valuation (Figure 11), we get the same trends as before. 
With historical cost valuation (Figure 12), we get a slightly different picture: the before-interest before-
tax rate of profit shows a declining trend since the late 1970s, but the after-tax rate of profit is pretty 
much flat (with large fluctuations in the downturns of the late 1990s and the Great Recession). 
 
4. Technology and Distribution: Drivers of Profitability  
4.1. Decomposing the Profit Rate 
 What are the drivers of profitability trends that have been summarized in Figures 1 through 12? 
To address this question, we will decompose the rate of profit into two components, one capturing the 
class distribution of income and the other capturing technological factors as: rate of profit = 
(profit/output) * (output/capital stock), i.e., the rate of profit is decomposed as the product of the profit 
share and the output-capital ratio (also known as capital productivity). Of course, this is not the only 
way to decompose the rate of profit. Starting with Weisskopf (1979), many researchers have also 
included the capacity utilization to capture the short run fluctuations in the rate of profit due to 
fluctuations of aggregate demand as follows: rate of profit = (profit/output) * (output/capacity output) * 
(capacity output/capital stock). Here, the rate of profit is decomposed as the product of the profit share, 
capacity utilization and the capacity-capital ratio. 
 FIGURE 9: Rate of Profit, U.S. Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 
(Capital Stock: Replacement Cost Nonfinancial Assets) 
 
FIGURE 10: Rate of Profit, U.S. Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 
(Capital Stock: Historical Cost Nonfinancial Assets) 
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FIGURE 11: Rate of Profit, U.S. Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 
(Capital Stock: Replacement Cost Net Worth) 
 
FIGURE 12: Rate of Profit, U.S. Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 
(Capital Stock: Replacement Cost Net Worth) 
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Following Michl (1988) and Foley and Michl (1999), we will use the former decomposition, 
instead of the latter. The advantage of using this decomposition – rate of profit = profit share * capital 
productivity – is that we can avoid estimating an unobservable quantity like “capacity output”, without 
which the capacity utilization rate cannot be defined. In effect this decomposition allows fluctuations in 
aggregate demand to impact on both profit shares and capital productivity instead of concentrating on 
its effect on the capacity utilization rate. This is more realistic because aggregate demand fluctuations 
can impact not only aggregate output (in comparison to “capacity” output) but also income distribution 
and technological factors. 
For the decomposition analysis, we will use NIPA data because that gives us the direct data on 
the commonly used measure of “broad” profit flows, the net operating surplus. The share of profit is, 
then, computed as the ratio of (a) net operating surplus (net value added less employee compensation 
less production & import taxes) with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments, and (b) 
the net value added; the output-capital ratio (or capital productivity) is computed as the ratio of (a) the 
net value added, and (b) net stock of total fixed assets.   
 
4.1.1. Replacement Cost Capital Stock 
Figures 13 and 15 display the decomposition of the profit rate into its technology and 
distribution components for the CB and NFCB sector respectively, where the replacement cost 
valuation of the capital stock has been used. What trends in income distribution and technology emerge 
from the data? Both Figures 13 and 15 (which use replacement cost capital stock) display very 
interesting trends regarding technology and income distribution.  
Let us first take up technology. Figure 13 and 15 show that there were four different periods of 
technological evolution in post-War U.S. The first period, running up to 1968, witnessed improving 
capital productivity, with a burst of capital-saving technological change over the decade 1958-68. With 
1968 (for CB) and 1966 (for NFCB) marking the apogee of capital productivity in post-War U.S., we 
enter the second period of declining capital productivity, which continues for the next decade and a half 
till 1982. For NFCB, capital productivity declines from 0.799 in 1966 to 0.543 in 1982, a massive 32 
percent fall in a decade and a half; for the CB sector, the output capital ratio declines from 0.800 in 
1968 to 0.555 in 1982, a similar 31 percent decline. The declining trend is reversed in 1982, which 
marks the beginning of the third period of technology, a period of slowly rising capital productivity. 
The third period runs from 1982 to 2000, with capital productivity rising by 25 percent for CB and 28 
percent for the NFCB sector over the whole period (with a significant acceleration during the 1990s) 
but attaining a peak that is significantly lower than its peak in 1968. There is a very significant trend-
reversal in 2000, which takes us into the fourth period of declining capital productivity. Since 2000, 
capital productivity has trended downward and the magnitude of decline (between 2000 and 2009) has 
been a massive 27 percent for the CB sector and 28 percent for the NFCB sector.
12
 Thus, the previous 
period's gain has been completely wiped out, with the value of the output-capital ratio now at its lowest 
in the whole post-War period.   
  Let us now turn to income distribution between the two fundamental social classes in 
capitalism. This displays interesting, but less complicated, trends. Figures 13 and 15 show that the 
whole postwar period can be divided into two broad periods in terms of the evolution of income 
distribution between capitalists and workers. The first period runs till the early 1980s and witnessed a 
significant decline in the share of income accruing to the capitalist class, with most of that decline 
taking place after the late 1960s. Between 1948 and 1980, the share of profit income in the NFCB 
sector declined from 22.27 percent to 14.46 percent of total corporate income, a massive drop by all 
accounts; for the CB sector, the corresponding decline was from 22.52 percent in 1948 to 15.81 percent 
in 1980. The trend of declining profit share was reversed in 1982, which begins the second period 
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 The decline in capital productivity since 2000 is a little exaggerated because the years since 2007 have witnessed low 
capacity utilization. But if we instead look at the peak-to-peak period 1997-2007, we see a similar, though smaller, decline 
in the output-capital ratio of 12 and 13 percent for the CB and NFCB sectors respectively.  
marked by rising profit shares much more so for the whole CB than the NFCB sector (giving evidence 
of the rising share of profits accruing to the financial sector). The second period of rising (or flat) profit 
share also shows major fluctuations. The rising trend that continues almost unbroken from 1982 is 
reversed for brief periods significantly by the two recessions. Both the 2001 and the 2008 recessions 
display a period of rapid decline in profit share starting about 2-3 years before the start of the recession; 
but the decline over the 2001 downturn is quickly reversed, and even surpassed, during the ensuing 
recovery.  
Bringing together trends in the evolution of technology and income distribution, we can now 
offer an explanation of profitability trends in the U.S. over the post War period and a hypothesis for the 
structural crisis that many have identified as having begun in 2008. The decades immediately following 
the second World War saw stable (or rising) profits because profit shares were stable and capital 
productivity was rising. The period since the mid-1960s saw a significant deterioration of the 
technological underpinnings of U.S. capitalism with capital productivity falling. With profit shares 
falling as well, this meant declining profitability, which resulted in the first structural crisis of post-war 
capitalism in the late 1970s. The neoliberal counter-revolution restored the income share of the 
capitalist class, especially of those related to the financial sector. The information technology 
revolution gave an impetus for capital-saving technological change so that capital productivity started 
increasing once again. These extremely favorable trends in both distribution and technology helped a 
revival of the profit rate. Dumenil and Levy (2010) and Mohun (2010) have highlighted these favorable 
developments. 
  
 
 FIGURE 13: Profit Rate Decomposition, U.S. Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital 
Stock: Replacement Cost Net Total Fixed Assets)  
 
 
FIGURE 14: Profit Rate Decomposition, U.S. Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital 
Stock: Historical Cost Net Total Fixed Assets) 
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 FIGURE 15: Profit Rate Decomposition, U.S. Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 
(Capital Stock: Replacement Cost Net Total Fixed Assets) 
 
 
FIGURE 16: Profit Rate Decomposition, U.S. Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 
(Capital Stock: Historical Cost Net Total Fixed Assets) 
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However, the favorable technological impetus worked itself out by the late 1990s. Faced with 
falling capital productivity, profitability was shored up by a further shift in income distribution towards 
the capitalist class, helped no doubt by financialization and the growth of working class debt 
(Lapavitsas, 2010). When the share of profit income collapsed, preceding the downturn of 2007, this 
reinforced adverse technological trends to precipitate another structural crisis of capitalism. The build-
up of working-class debt, which had helped fuel the housing price boom and also effected a regressive 
income redistribution, ushered in a long period of deleveraging when the Great Recession struck, 
prolonging a downturn into the severest crisis since the Great Depression.      
 
4.1.2. Historical Cost Valuation of Capital Stock 
Figure 14 and 16 present the decomposition results for historical cost capital stock data. The 
results are pretty similar to those for replacement cost capital stock. The main difference is that, with 
historical cost capital stock, the decline in capital productivity starts in the late 1970s and continues 
right into the current period. If historical cost valuation is used, it is difficult to locate the structural 
crisis of global capitalism in the late 1970s.  
 
4.2. Patterns of Technological Change 
The decomposition of profit rate decomposition helps identify the technological and 
distributional underpinnings of the current crisis. Marx‟s discussion of technological change, 
accumulation and profitability gives a primacy to technology in driving profitability. Capitalist 
competition compels a process of technical change that deploys increasing capital intensity and 
mechanization as a means of extracting a larger surplus from labor. This pattern of labor-saving 
technological change is critical to Marx‟s formulation of the law of tendency of the falling rate of 
profit.  The insights from the profit decomposition exercise could be sharpened with an analysis of the 
specific patterns of technological change over the decades.  
To explore patterns of technological change, Figure 17 plots capital productivity and two 
measures of labor productivity (output per person and output per hour) for the U.S. nonfinancial 
corporate business sector for the period 1958-2010. With labor and capital productivity juxtaposed, it is 
immediately clear that the NFCB sector has witnessed three distinct periods of technological evolution 
since 1968. The first period, running from 1966 to 1982, witnessed what Foley and Michl (1999) have 
termed Marx-biased technological change: growing labor productivity and falling capital productivity. 
Essentially productivity of labor is increased, during such periods, through increasing capital intensity. 
This is the period which saw the collapse of the capital labor accord that had buttressed the golden age 
as profit rates declined. The decline in profitability is however related to unfavorable (Marx-biased) 
technical change rather than to any decrease in labor productivity. 
Restoring profitability depended in the first instance on squeezing workers to ensure a rising 
profit share – reversing the erosion in preceding period. However, the second period, stretching from 
1982 to 2000, also saw a different pattern of technological evolution when both labor and capital 
productivity increased. This pattern of technological change, which is favorable to profitability, does 
not conform to the classic pattern of Marx-biased technical change. The twin trends of rising capital 
productivity and rising profit share propelled the recovery of profitability in this period. 
The third period begins in 2000 and is currently still running its course. In this third period, the 
U.S. NFCB sector is back to a regime of Marx-biased technological change: labor productivity has 
continued to grow, along with the profit share, but capital productivity has declined to its lowest in the 
post- war period. This period poses potential profitability problems for capitalism. In the current period 
since 2000, profitability has so far (for about a decade) been propped up by the regressive redistribution 
of income away from the working class while ruling class coalition, aided by the housing bubble and 
financialization, pursued successful campaign of enrichment.  While there does not appear to be any 
sign that this quest for enrichment is being curbed in the wake of the financial meltdown, there would 
be a limit to the extent to which profit shares can continue to be increased. At the same time the 
persistent decline in capital productivity is exerting an inexorable downward pull on profitability. The 
sharp decline in capital productivity is a significant factor shaping the current crisis. 
 
 
FIGURE 17: Patterns of Technological Change, U.S. Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 
1958-2010 (Capital Stock: Replacement Cost Net Total Fixed Assets)  
 
4. 3 Behind Declining Capital Productivity 
 What lies behind the evolution of capital productivity over the past few decades? What is 
driving its sharp decline since 2000? We will approach such questions through two routes. First, we 
will look at capital productivity from the perspective of capital intensity; second, we will approach 
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capital productivity through relative rates of technological progress in the capital goods sector. 
 
4.3.1. Labor Productivity and Capital Intensity 
 Capital productivity is, by definition, the ratio of the labor productivity (Y/L) and the capital 
intensity (K/L). Hence, the growth rate of capital productivity is the difference between the growth rate 
of labor productivity and capital intensity. Figure 18 summarizes the growth rates of capital 
productivity and its two components for the three different periods of technological evolution that we 
have identified for the postwar U.S. economy: 1966-1982, 1982-2000 and 2000-2010. 
In the first period between 1966 and 1982, which was the prelude to the first post-War structural 
crisis of the early 1980s, capital productivity fell by 2.38 percent per annum; during the same period, 
labor productivity (output per person) increased by 0.78 percent per annum and capital intensity 
increased by 3.16 per cent per annum. During the recovery between 1982 and 2000, capital 
productivity grew at an annual compound rate of 1.39 percent per annum; however in the run-up to the 
current structural crisis between 2000 and 2010, it fell at the rate of 2.43 percent per annum. Between 
1982 and 2000, labor productivity grew at an annual compound rate of 2.11 percent per annum; 
between 2000 and 2010, it grew at 2.03 percent per annum. Thus, labor productivity grew more rapidly 
after 1982, and at roughly the same rate during these two later periods, but capital productivity 
displayed sharply divergent trends.  
The difference in the evolution of capital productivity during the recovery from the last 
structural crisis and the prelude to the current crisis (the second and third period) reflects the different 
evolutions of capital intensity in these two periods. Between 1982 and 2000, capital intensity grew very 
slowly at about 0.73 percent per annum, suggesting that the increase in labor productivity in this period 
was not driven by Marx–biased technical change. Between 2000 and 2010, on the other hand, capital 
intensity grew six times faster at 4.46 percent per annum. Comparing with the first period, it seems that 
both the technologically positive period during 1982 to 2000 and the technologically regressive period 
since 2000 has been driven by the unusual growth of capital intensity.  
During the former period, a very slow growth of capital intensity allowed for a relatively rapid 
growth of labor productivity, This pattern ran its course by 2000, after which only a very high growth 
of capital intensity has managed to keep labor productivity growing at a similar rate. The question, 
therefore, really boils down to explaining this transformation in the pattern of technological change 
evidenced in the different pace of growth of capital intensity in the two periods. 
 
 
FIGURE 18: Growth of Capital Productivity, Labour Productivity and Capital Intensity, U.S. 
Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector (Capital Stock: Replacement Cost Net Total Fixed 
Assets) 
 Marx‟s discussion of mechanization and capital-intensive technical change viewed the 
trend as an outcome of a rapid growth of accumulation. It was capitalism‟s dynamic drive to 
accumulate and innovate that led to the potential erosion of profitability. The current period is 
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paradoxical in that it is also period when capital accumulation has slowed down even as capital 
intensity has risen sharply
13
.   
 
4.3.1. Real Capital Productivity and the Relative Price of Capital 
 The other way to approach this question is, following Michl (1988), to decompose capital 
productivity into the ratio of (a) real capital productivity (ratio of real net value added and real capital 
stock) and (b) the relative price of capital (ratio of implicit price deflator for capital stock and the GDP 
deflator). Note that a rising trend in real capital productivity, and a falling trend in the relative price of 
capital can increase the rate of profit, and therefore corresponds to what Marx termed the 
countervailing tendencies to the tendency for the rate of profit to decline with capitalist development. 
The real output-capital ratio captures the effect of technological change that is independent of relative 
price changes. It shows, in real terms, the output per unit of labor-power (labor productivity) that is 
engendered by mechanization (capital per unit of labor-power). The relative price of capital (ratio of 
implicit price deflator for capital stock and the GDP deflator) is what Marx had called the “cheapening 
of the elements of capital”. When it falls, it gives indication of relatively rapid technological change in 
the capital goods sector in contrast to the whole economy.  
 Figure 19 and 20 plot the nominal & real capital productivity and the relative price of capital for 
the period 1946-2010 for the Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector; the former uses the net stock of 
total fixed assets and the latter uses the net stock of nonresidential fixed assets as measures of the 
capital stock. Both display similar trends; hence, the results are not driven by the pronounced boom in 
residential asset prices in the 2000s. 
Figures 19 and 20 show that since the early 1980s, the real output-capital ratio has been more or 
                                                          
13
 The rate of accumulation (non-residential investment as a share of fixed nonresidential assets) has fallen from a peak of 
about 4.5% in 1999/2000 to about 0.5% in 2009  (Kotz 2011). 
less stable, hovering around a value of 0.6, so that movements in the nominal output-capital ratio has 
been driven completely by movements in the relative price of capital. After rising significantly between 
1966 and 1982, the relative price of capital saw a steady decline for a decade with the declining trend 
broken in 1993. Between 1993 and 2004, the relative price of capital remained stable at around a value 
of 0.91 and started increasing again since 2004. Shaikh (1998) has pointed to a systematic upward bias 
in durable and capital good price indexes due to inadequate adjustment for quality changes. Hence, we 
should interpret the relative price trends cautiously, but the decline in capital productivity in the run up 
to the current crisis would reflect the relatively slower pace of technological progress in the capital 
goods industry.  
4.3.2. Capital Productivity and the Crisis,  
The preceding analysis suggests that the sharp fall in capital productivity since 2000 after a 
period of fairly steady rise for nearly a two decade period, reflected the basic structural weakness of the 
US economy as it plunged into crisis. In this paper, we have attempted to unravel what lay behind the 
evolution of capital productivity.  
The pervasive adoption and growth of information technology would have almost certainly 
played an important role in shaping the particular evolution in the nineties when capital productivity 
showed an upward trend. New forms of managerial control and organization, including just-in-time and 
lean production systems have been deployed to enforce increases in labor productivity since the 1980‟s. 
The phenomena of „speed-up‟ and stretching of work has enabled the extraction of larger productivity 
gains per worker hour as evidenced the faster growth of labor productivity after 1982. People have 
been working harder and faster. Information technology has facilitated the process. It enables greater 
surveillance and control of the worker, and also rationalization of production to “computerize” and 
automate certain tasks.  
 
 FIGURE 19: Nominal & Real Output-Capital Ratio and Relative Price of Capital, U.S. NFCB 
Sector (Capital Stock: Replacement Cost Net Total Fixed Assets) 
 
FIGURE 20: Nominal & Real Output-Capital Ratio and Relative Price of Capital, U.S. NFCB 
Sector (Capital Stock: Replacement Cost Net Nonresidential Fixed Assets) 
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Moreover, these productivity gains would have been possible with smaller increases in 
investment since this technology does not necessarily require increasing capital intensity on a 
commensurate scale. Information technology has also been realizing rapid gains in cost reductions so 
that IT infrastructure is becoming less costly to adopt. Further, a large part of the initial R&D cost was 
borne and subsidized by the State, further lowering the cost of capital investment. Thus labor 
productivity was increased without necessitating increasing capital intensity.  
The favorable trend in capital productivity is also fostered by globalization and off-shoring of 
production. This allows a further cheapening of capital and intermediate inputs with some of the more 
labor intensive and lower productivity (low value added) sectors being outsourced. This would also be 
reflected in declining and stable relative prices of capital till 2004, which ameliorated the effect of 
slower technological change in the capital goods sector through cheap imports (aided by the weak 
dollar) and the retention of the higher productivity – high technology sectors within the US. After 2000 
as larger sections of the production process got relocated globally, this advantage was exhausted. In the 
1990‟s US multinationals added 4.4 million jobs in the US and 2.7 million jobs overseas – that is for 
every one outsourced job about two jobs were being created in the US (Wessel 2011). The pattern 
changed drastically in the 2000‟s. 2.9 million jobs were axed in the US even as 2.4 million jobs were 
added abroad.  It is clear that the process of off-shoring was accelerated in the past decade. The global 
relocation of production would also be an important factor underlying the twin phenomena of declining 
rates of accumulation and increasing capital intensity in the US.  
 
5. Conclusion 
There are two broad strands in the Marxist theorization of crisis: those focusing on demand 
problems and those focusing on profitability. In the context of a lack of consensus on both the 
appropriate measure of the profit rate and the characterization of its role and trend in the prelude to the 
crisis, this paper is concerned with an empirical investigation of the profit rate that would help clarify 
the theoretical debates. The main conclusion that we can derive from inspecting the time series plots of 
various measures of the rate of profit for the U.S. economy (Figure 1 through 12) is that, other than one 
case, all the measures display similar trends: there is a break in the declining trend of profitability in the 
early 1980s; the subsequent period is marked by either a trend-less or a slowly rising trend in 
profitability. The only exception is a measure of the rate of profit which uses historical cost valuation 
for the capital stock and before-tax (both direct and indirect taxes), before-interest profit flow; this 
measure displays a secularly declining trend for the whole postwar period.  
 The weight of evidence thus suggests clearly that the current crisis was not preceded by a 
prolonged period of declining profitability. In fact, the current crisis was preceded by a period of rising 
profitability, buoyed by favorable trends in both profit share and technology. Capital productivity 
increased through the nineties along with rising labor productivity and declining capital intensity. The 
tentative hypothesis provided here is that these favorable trends can be explained as the outcome of the 
specificities of the information technology, globalization and the global relocation of production, and 
the intensification of managerial control to enforce a steep increase of labor productivity.  
Dumenil and Levy (2010) and Mohun 2010 have highlighted the favorable movements in 
profitability to argue that the current crisis cannot be viewed as a crisis of profitability. They have 
pointed to the similarities with the favorable pattern of capital productivity and profitability before the 
Great Depression. We present the profit rate decomposition using the Dumenil-Levy data set (Dumenil 
and Levy 2010b) in Figure 21, in order to make a broad comparison. The noteworthy feature about the 
Great Depression (that emerges in Figure 21) is the sharp drop in capital productivity after 1929; this 
breaks the longer term upward trend of capital productivity between 1910 and 1950. Once again the 
factors that held the pattern of Marx biased technical change - with increasing capital intensity – in 
check and fostered favorable trends in capital productivity – failed to prevent the precipitous fall in 
capital productivity. The postwar recovery enabled the resumption of these favorable trends with the 
capital-labor accord and the post New Deal state apparatus. 
We believe there is reason to be a little cautious about this conclusion. The critical factor that 
emerges from the decomposition analysis is the sharp decline in capital productivity prior to the crisis, 
providing indication of deeper technological problems. There also seems to be a difference between the 
current crisis and the Great Depression. The current crisis began in 2008 and was preceded by an 8 year 
period of declining capital productivity. The Great Depression, which began in 1929 was not preceded 
by declining capital productivity. In fact, it was preceded by a period of rising capital productivity (as 
Figure 21 indicates) –what Dumenil and Levy have termed “The Great Leap Forward”. It seems, 
therefore, that while the Great Depression cannot be characterized as a profitability crisis (because both 
capital productivity and profit shares were favorable to capital), the current crisis requires a more 
nuanced characterization (because capital productivity was declining, and profitability has been 
propped up by regressive redistribution of income).  
Of course, once the crisis hits, there is a precipitous fall in aggregate demand leading to a fall in 
capacity utilization; this reduces the rate of profit during the crisis as is seen both during the Great 
Depression and the current crisis. What is important, therefore, is to look at the period preceding the 
crisis. In that respect, the current crisis seems to be different from the Great Depression.  
Declining profitability might not have caused the Great Recession, but it certainly is an 
intimation of an impending profitability problem. Profitability still matters. The attack on public sector 
unions and the continual push for corporate tax breaks signal a drive to further shore up the profit 
share. It is difficult to see the process going much further without exacerbating social tensions. The 
slowdown in accumulation and the fall in capital productivity however portend a fragile recovery. What 
complicates matters further is the class configuration underlying neoliberalism that has allowed the 
siphoning of surplus towards the enrichment and consumption of the rich. This configuration is 
depressing capital accumulation in the US, using the fears of a growing budget deficit to rein in fiscal 
stimulus or redistributive spending programs and possibly stifling technological innovation and R&D 
spending too (Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000; Dumenil & Levy, 2010). Without a deeper structural 
transformation of this configuration there would be little scope for a sustained recovery of 
accumulation. 
 
 
FIGURE 21: Profit Rate Decomposition, U.S. Private Economy, 1869-2010 (Data Source: 
Dumenil & Levy, 2010) 
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APPENDIX 
1. Data Sources 
1.1. BEA DATA: NIPA and FIXED ASSET TABLES 
 
All data that has been used occur at an annual frequency. The following variables have been 
used: 
 
Gross value added, profits, taxes and other flow variables are taken from NIPA Table 1.14 for both CB 
and NFCB sectors: 1929-2010. Data downloaded on June 22, 2011. 
 
Replacement cost net capital stock (total fixed asset) data is from BEA Fixed Asset Table 6.1, and 
replacement cost depreciation data is from NIPA Table 6.4; these are year-end estimates: 1929-2010. 
Gross capital stock is computed as net capital stock plus depreciation. Data downloaded on June 29, 
2011. 
 
Historical cost net capital stock (total fixed asset) data is from BEA Fixed Asset Table 6.3, and 
historical cost depreciation data is from NIPA Table 6.6; these are year-end estimates: 1929-2010. 
Gross capital stock is computed as net capital stock plus depreciation. Data downloaded on June 29, 
2011. 
 
Data on the labour productivity index (output per hour and output per person) is from the Bureau of 
Labour Statistics: 1958-2010.  Data downloaded from FRB St. Louis on June 23, 2011. 
 
Data on the GDP deflator is from NIPA Table 1.1.4. Data was downloaded on July 03, 2011. 
 
The relative price of fixed capital is computed as the ratio of (a) an implicit price deflator for the fixed 
capital stock, and (b) the GDP deflator. The implicit price deflator for the net stock of private fixed 
assets is computed in two steps using the formulae in the NIPA Guide (2005). In the first step the 
chained dollar value of the stock of fixed assets is computed as: chained dollar value = (chain-type 
quantity index * current dollar value in 2005)/100, where data for the chain-type quantity index of 
fixed assets is available from BEA Fixed Assets Table 6.2, the base year is 2005 and the current dollar 
value of the fixed asset stock is taken from BEA Fixed Assets Table 6.1. In the second step the implicit 
price deflator is computed as: implicit price deflator = (current dollar value * 100)/ chained dollar 
value. 
 
 
1.2. FLOW OF FUNDS DATA 
 
All data are for the Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business sector and have been downloaded 
on June 17, 2011. We use the following variables at an annual frequency for our analysis: 
 
nonfinancial assets: series FL102010005.A 
 
nonfinancial assets at historical cost: series FL102010115.A 
 
net worth: series FL102090005.A 
 net worth at historical cost: series FL102090115.A 
 
corporate profits before tax excluding IVA and CCAdj: series FA106060005.A 
 
taxes on corporate income: series FA106231005.A 
 
taxes on production and imports less subsidies, payable with corporate farms: series FA106240181.A 
 
capital consumption allowance: series FA106300015.A 
 
inventory valuation adjustment: series FA105020601.A 
 
2. Profitability using Broader Measures of Capital Stock 
 In the text of the paper we have used various measures of fixed assets (or net worth) as an 
estimate of the capital stock that supports the extraction and realization of surplus value. In a more 
complete analysis of the process of capitalist reproduction, for instance the one presented by Marx in 
Volume II of Capital and formalized in Foley (1982) and Basu (2011), one needs to clarify that what we 
have denoted as capital stock really refers to stocks of value that attain three different forms in a typical 
capitalist economy: productive capital (un-depreciated fixed assets, raw materials, inventory of 
unfinished products), commercial capital (inventory of finished commodities awaiting sale) and 
financial capital (money and other financial assets held by firms).  
While it is difficult to get data on every component of the three forms of capital, there is 
relatively reliable data on inventories of finished goods for the nonfarm sector in the US economy. In 
this section of the Appendix, we add the value of nonfarm inventories to the various measures of 
replacement value fixed assets to arrive at a broader measure of capital stock and carry out the profit 
rate decomposition with this broader measure. The results are presented in Figure A1-A4. The 
conclusion that we draw from these figures is that the inclusion of inventories do not change the 
profitability, distribution or technology trends in any way. Hence, the results presented in the text of the 
paper are valid even for the broader measure of capital stock which includes inventories. 
 Figure A1: Rate of Profit, US Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital Stock: Replacement 
Value Net Nonresidential Fixed Assets and nonfarm inventories) 
 
 
Figure A2: Rate of Profit, US Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital Stock: Replacement 
Value Net Total Fixed Assets and nonfarm inventories) 
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 Figure A3: Rate of Profit, US Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital Stock: 
Replacement Value Net Nonresidential Fixed Assets and nonfarm inventories) 
 
Figure A4: Rate of Profit, US Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital Stock: 
Replacement Value Net Total Fixed Assets and nonfarm inventories) 
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